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The Treatment of National Agricultural 
Policies in Free Trade Areas 
Tim Josling 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Post-war trade policy has emphasized multilateral trade rules and the principle of non-discrimination 
among GATT members.  In reality, the majority of GATT members are associated with some regional or other 
trading bloc, within which conditions of market access show a degree of preference.  Whether or not the current 
Uruguay Round strengthens and extends the GATT rules, there is likely to be a continued interest in regional 
trade arrangements.  The issue of the treatment of domestic economic and sectoral policies within free-trade 
areas will be an important facet of such trade groupings. 
In agriculture the pervasive effect  of domestic agricultural policies, in particular those that regulate 
markets and support prices, poses special problems for free trade areas (FTAs).  These problems are of two 
types: the impact of the policies themselves on market access within the FTA; and the impact of free-trade area 
rules, such as tariff reductions and other trade policy adjustments, on the ability of the domestic agricultural 
programs to achieve their objectives.  The issues of the compatibility of national farm  polici~s and free-trade 
areas is  also of importance to outsiders.  This study addresses these problems as  they relate to the  current 
negotiations on regional trade arrangements in both the EC and North America. 
It is convenient to start with the main agricultural trade and policy issues facing countries contem plating 
the creation of FTAs.1  Such countries face several choices.  These include the following: 
i)  the extent to which agricultural trade should be included in the provisions of the FT  A, 
ii)  the treatment of domestic policies as potential non-tariff barriers to trade within the PTA, 
. iii)  the impact of freer intra-bloc trade on the efficacy of domestic instruments of price and income 
1  The emphasis in this paper is on the impact of free trade in agricultural commodities on the product price 
support policies of the participating countries.  There are important implications for agriculture and agricultural 
policy of freer factor movements and greater flows of investment among countries.  In some cases these other 
aspects of market liberalization go along with freer trade.  These factor flow issues are not addressed in this 
paper. 
1 support, 
(iv)  the harmonization of regulatory systems and standards as  a way  of reducing artificial  trade 
impediments, and 
v)  the implications for third countries of the choices made by participants in an FTA. 
These questions  are used as  the structure of the study,  with  a section  devoted  to each issue.  The 
implications of this  analysis  for  European and North American free-trade talks  are then discussed.  A  final 
section summarises the main conclusions.-
II. Inclusion of Agriculture in FT  As 
There are four  main reasons to  include  agriculture in  the provisions of an FTA.  First, one of the 
countries may be an exporter of agricultural goods and insist on gaining market access for those products.  The 
other countries may be forced  reluctantly to grant such access  even  at political cost.  Secondly,_ to  omit  an 
important sector from trade liberalization implies possible intra-bloc distortions from different price levels for 
food,  different raw material costs for agro-based industries, and different rural employment conditions.  The 
potential for  conflict  exists  when such obvious  disparities are perpetuated.  Thirdly,  the  need to  track  and 
examine all agricultural and food products at the border, to protect national price level differences, will eventually 
become an administrative anomaly.  And fourthly, the GATT article that allows a departure from the general 
principle for  non-discrimination in  trade  (Article XXIV)  states that "essentially all trade"  must be covered. 
Though not strictly enforced, this provision at least gives a presumptive argument for inclusion of agriculture. 
There is essentially only one argument for excluding agriculture from an FTA.  Domestic agricultural 
price support policies rely on import controls and export assistance to regulate the domestic market.  Entrenche9 
poHiical  and economic interests make it difficult to contemplate the negotiation of free regional trade in the 
presence of such policies.  It  maybe  deemed not worth the u:ouble.  There are a  number of examples,  as 
discussed below, which illustrate this unwillingness to tackle agricultural policy issues within an FTA. 
The question of the inclusion or exclusion of agriculture from an FTA is illuminated by consideration 
of both the European and the North American experiences.  This section will examine the arguments for and 
2 against the inclusion of  agricultural trade in free trade areas, through a discussion of the treatment of agriculture 
in the European Community (EC), in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EC/EFTA bilateral 
free-trade agreements, the European Economic Area (EEA) accord just concluded between the EC and EFTA, 
and the Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement (CUSTA) of 1989. 
a) Agriculture in European Integration 
The issue of the place of agriculture in European integration goes back at least to the inter-war period. 
The farming  sector posed a problem for  the Economic Union between Belgium and Luxembourg (BLEU), 
negotiated in 1922.  Luxembourg's poor farming structure and history of high protection made it difficult  to 
contemplate a level playing field in agriculture.  A series of payments were made to Luxembourg farmers (out 
of customs receipts from the Union) to keep their prices above those in Belgium.2  Later, Luxembourg began 
to impose import restrictions to protect their market.  When the Benelux union was formed in 1948, Belgian 
agriculture faced competition from the Netherlands.  The solution on this occasion was to allow co~ntries to fix 
minimum prices and control imports, though giving a degree of preference to partner supplies.  The Dutch were 
never happy with this arrangement and tried on several occasions to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of 
the Benelux agreement.  It was  made  abundantly clear by  the  Dutch that no  such  illiberal internal  trade 
restrictions would be allowed in a wider European Economic Community (EEC). 
In the event, the Treaty of Rome, which set up the EEC, made no distinction between agricultural and 
other foods as regards internal trade.  The Dutch view prevailed over those (led by the French) who argued for 
quantitative controls.  Subsequent politicians showed less good sense than the drafters of the Treaty.  Internal 
free trade in the Community has been distorted since 1969 by the monetary adjustments (MCAs) made at the 
borders to relieve farmers from the impact of  currency movements.  Nevertheless, it is generally true that internal 
agricultural trade" is  free  of restrictions, as  evidenced by the fact  that no  agricultural policy  measures were 
2 For details of this and other early attempts at dealing with agricultural policy in European integration, see 
Micha~l Tracy, Government and Agriculture in Western Europe. 1880-1988. Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990. 
3 included in the 1992 internal market program.3  Because the Community chose to go beyond a free trade area, 
by instituting a  common external policy,  free factor  movements,  and a  common agricultural policy,  the EC 
experience has less direct relevance to the topic of agriculture in FrAs, and it will nofbe discussed in detail. 
By contrast to the EC, the countries that negotiated the EFrA decided to exclude agriculture from the 
terms of its  free  trade provision.  The recently concluded discussions  between EFrA and the EC, on the 
formation of a European Economic Area (EEA), highlighted  this  difference.  In the event, agriculture was 
omitted from the free-trade provisions of the EEA. 
The reasons for the exclusion of agriculture from  the EFrA were broadly historical.  In July 1956, at 
a time of intensive negotiations on the future trade relations in post-war Europe, the UK suggested the formation 
of a free-trade area for all the OEEC countries - including the six initial EEC members.  The Six were not 
convinced that a mere free-trade area would be satisfactory: it did not hold out the promise of closer political 
relationships.  Moreover, they distrusted the UK's insistence that such an FrA exclude agriculture (to preserVe 
the practice of Commonwealth Preference) and chose to continue on their way toward the Rome Treaty.4  The 
UK and six other countries (The Outer Seven) pursued the FrA option, leading to the creation of the EFrA 
in the Stockholm Treaty of 1960.  This Treaty, heavily influenced by British trade policy, contained an agreement 
that the trade liberalisation provisions would not apply to agriculture and fIsheries (Articles 21 and 26). 
The legacy of the decision still remains.  EFrA is an incomplete free-trade area because it omits these 
two important sectors of the economy.  Some bilateral arrangements were made between Denmark, when an 
EFrA member, and the other members, particularily the UK, to ease the export of farm products.  The UK also 
agreed to allow the import of some fIsh  products from EFrA partnerS', subject to a minimum-import price, in 
the late 1960s.  Some duties on agricultural products were bound in 1966, and market access was improved in 
3  For a fuller discussion of EC trade policy in agriculture, see T. Josliog, "European Community Policies 
Towards Trade in Agricultural Products," and for a detailed discussion of the links between agricultural policy 
and 1992 see D.R. Kelch  (ed) EC 1992:  Implications for World Food and Agricultural Trade, USDA.  Staff 
Report Number AGES 9133, October 1991. 
4  For a discussion of this period, see Michael Tracy, (Qp.,.£i!). 
4 1971, but EFTA essentially failed to tackle the agricultural anomaly in its thirty years of existence. 
The same decision, to exclude agriculture, was made at the time of the series of bilateral trade pacts 
among the EFTA countries and the EC, following the desertion of the UK and Denmark from EFTA in 1973. 
Countries were agreed that trade barriers should not be re-erected among former EFTA partners: free trade 
agreements between the EFTA countries and the EC looked to be the answer.  But in agriculture and fisheries, 
the issue did not arise.  No new barriers were erected on farm products as no preferences were eroded.  Swiss 
farm exports, for example, were not allowed free access into the UK market under EFTA rules, so they suffered 
no loss of preference with UK accession to the EC.  It  was the UK's Commonwealth Preference system that had 
to take most of the adjustment to UK membership in the area of agricultural trade. 
Whether the EC-EFTA bilaterals could have included agriculture is uncertain.  The EC had by that time 
developed the Common Agricultural Policy, a heavy-handed approach, which involved rules on free trade within 
the EC coupled with an overly-restrictive system for controlling third country imports.  The protectionist face 
of the CAP toward third countries, however, was not the main problem for the EFTA-EC agreements.  Austria, 
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Finland (made a full EFTA member in 1969) and Iceland (which joined in 1970) 
and Portugal all had restrictive regimes for farm trade.  The issue was trade within the EC-EFTA bloc.  EFTA 
countries could hardly have been expected to have adopted the CAP: the loss of control of rural policy, seen as 
crucial  to  national security and social  policy in  several  of these  countries, was  too much  to expect of non-
members.  The supranational nature of the EC was (and is) much more evident in the case of agriculture than 
in most other areas of economic activity.  The full set of regulations governing agricultural marketing together 
with a sharing of the fmancial burden and the need to harmonise prices would have been too much to impose 
on the EFTA countries.  Without extensive revision of EFTA policies in this area, free trade in farm products 
was out of the question. 
The  talks  aimed  at  establishing  a  European  Economic  Area  have  taken  the  same  approach  to 
agriculture.  Rather than open up the question of trade in agricultural products, both the EC and EFTA agreed 
that it be left off the table.  This decision was questioned by Spain, perhaps not so impressed with the historical 
precedents in this matter, which requested better access into the affluent nations of EFTA for Meditteranean 
5 products.  Rather than open up the whole "can of worms", it was decided to avoid this issue. 
The question remains whether this is a satisfactory or indeed a stable state of affairs.  Agriculture is a 
small and diminishing part of these economies.  It is quite possible, from an administrative perspective, to rule 
all farm trade beyond the scope of an EEA.S  But the long-term viability of such a decision is doubtful.  As the 
impact of integration is  felt,  one can imagine anomalies arising which would call into question the decision. 
These problems are likely to arise most clearly through developments in the food industry.  Unlike the small size 
of the farm sector, the food industry is one of the largest in the European economy.  People spend between 25 
and 30 percent of their income on food, either prepared at home or eaten out.  This industry is undergoing a 
process of rapid adjustment, including internal structural change and rationalisation and closer integration among 
countries.  The end result will  be an inevitable blurring of the national divisions of this sector.  Some of the 
largest firms are located in EFfA countries.  One would expect increasing pressure to remove anomalies that 
prevented these f1rDls from seeking the cheapest source of supply for raw materials in a competitive European 
food market.  This industry will also need to maintain its competitiveness in world markets.  In spite of these 
concerns, one would expect that agriCUlture will be kept formally out of the EEA arrangements for some time 
to come, with issues being dealt with on an ~  basis. 
Whether this exclusion of agriculture weakens the prospects for the EEA has been rendered largely 
moot by the application of  Sweden and Austria to join the EC and the expected application of Finland next year. 
Switzerland and Norway are presently discussing their own applications.  New members will not have the luxury 
of exempting agriculture from the arrangements: they will be expected to adopt the CAP in its entirety.  Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have all expressed a desire to join the EC, and the Community can ill afford to 
rebuff their  overtures.,  The prospect  of extending  the  CAP to  over  20  countries  worries  politicians  and 
bu~eaucrats both within and outside the EC. 
b) Agriculture in North American Integration 
Agricultural trade liberalization was not a major focus of the CUSTA.  At least three reasons can be 
5  This does, however, raise again the position of EFfA and the EEA within the GATT.  Article XXIV 
states that a free trade area must cover essentially all trade.  No one bothered to make an issue of the EFfA 
arrangement, but the same might not ~e true of an EEA treaty. 
6 advanced to explain this omission.  First, as major exporters, neither Canada nor the US think of the other as 
a large potential market for future sales.  In spite of considerable trade in US fruits and vegetables exported to 
Canada and in Canadian livestock products moving to the US, the main export possibilities are perceived to be 
elsewhere.  Many import restrictions in the two countries are in place to protect against dumping or to support 
some domestic program of market regulation or supply control.  The blatant protection. of an inefficient domestic 
sector, as illustrated by the farm policies of Japan and the European Community, is less common in the US and 
Canada, though the dairy (in both countries) and sugar (in the US) sectors stand out as  exceptions. 
Allied to this was the fact that agricultural policy and trade issues were a major focus of the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations.  At the time of negotiation of the Canada-US FTA, there was still hope that the 
Uruguay Round would severely curb agricultural protection and impose new rules on global agricultural trade. 
This made the task of negotiating bilateral rules both less urgent and more complicated: it seemed obvious that 
such matters were best left to the GAIT talks, and yet the outcome of the GAIT talks would not be known until 
after the bilateral agreement had been negotiated.  All attempt to prejudge that outcome would have  been 
resisted. 
A third reason lay just below the surface.  In Canada, many of the agricultural trade regulations are 
legislated and administered at the Provincial level.  The federal government runs its own set of farm programs 
often in parallel with those of the provinces.  The FTA was negotiated at the federal level and did not directly 
involve  negotiation  on  provincial  legislation:  the  federal  government was  assumed  to  be able  to  bring  the 
provinces into line at the implementation stage.  This assumption may not have been warrant~d in all cases.  Not 
only have provinces been able to resist the pressure from Ottawa to make changes consistent with the FTA, there 
has been evidence of some new initiatives at the provincial level to replace federal protection given up in the 
-
bilateral agreement. 
For whatever reasons, agriculture was treated lightly in the Canada-US FTA.  In Lipsey's terminology, 
contentious farm trade and policy issues were consigned to the "penumbra" of  the Agreement, reflecting "carefully 
7 crafted compromises relating to points of bilateral friction," rather than the "core" of liberal trade principles.6 
Michael Hart concludes  that the "obligations in the  agricultural sector [are)  significantly less  onerous than 
obligations  for  trade  in  industrial goods."  7  The  agricultural  provisions  included,  along  with  scheduled 
reductions in trade barriers, specific agreements on beef quotas, wine marketing, and cereal import licenses.  In 
addition, there was some attempt to avoid trade problems resulting from  different sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations.  But  the  dairy  sector  was  largely  excluded  from  consideration,  out  of deference  to  sectoral 
sensitivities. 
c)  Other FTAs and their treatments of agriculture 
The decision to exclude agricultural trade either in whole, as with EFTA, or in part, as with CUSTA, 
has been common on other continents.  Latin American trade pacts in the past generally have not tackled the 
issue of agricultural trade within their region.  This may change in the future, as countries in that region move 
to the use of tariffs, as discussed below.  Recent discussions among the ASEAN countries for an ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) which would bring down barriers to trade in that region also chose to avoid agriculture. 
Only the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand has really come 
to  grips with  the issue.  Agricultural trade, as well  as  trade in other products,  is  now free  between these 
countries.  This development was no doubt helped by the drastic reduction in government intervention in these 
two countries in the past five years, particularly in New Zealand, which paved the way for the removal of market 
distorting policies. 
III. Domestic Policies as  Non-tariff Barriers 
Perhaps the most obvious problem with excluding agriculture from the provisions of a free-trade area 
is  that domestic policies often act as  trade impediments.  The FTA cannot fully  develop  along the lines of 
regional specialisation if a major sector is excluded.  The issue of domestic policies as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
6  Richard Lipsey,  "The  Case for  Trilateralism; in Steven Globerman (cd)  Continental Accord:  North 
American Economic Integration, the Fraser Institute, Vancouver, 1991, pp. 114. 
7 Michael Hart, A NQrth American Free Trade Agreement: The Strategic Implications for Canada, Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, Ottawa, 1990, p. 113. 
8 in a free trade area is essentially the same as that being faced in the Uruguay Round of the GAIT with respect 
to multilateral trade.  Trade frictions will exist so long as domestic policies give incentives to domestic producers. 
In the  context  of the  GAIT round, the emphasis has been on the reduction of protection and the 
reinstrumentation  of domestic  and  trade  policies.  In  FrAs, members  could  attempt  to  reduce  producer 
incentives,  but may  have  difficulty  in  doing  so  without  corresponding  multilateral  action  by  non-member 
countries.  Reinstrumentation of policies may also be desirable for intra-bloc trade policy, but once again this 
runs  into the problem of "getting ahead"  of multilateral rule changes.  Regional problems are undoubtedly 
complicated by the existence of parallel negotiations at the GAIT level.  On the other hand, successful GAIT 
negotiations would  make the inclusion of agriculture in  FrAs much easier.  This section explores both the 
analytical issue of the consistency of domestic policies with free market access within the FrA and the issue of 
the links between regional and bilateral talks and the GAIT  .  negotiations. 
a) Free trade and domestic policies 
Free .trade is an imprecise concept.  It certainly implies the absence of deliberate tariff barriers and such 
non-tariff barriers as  quotas and paraflSca1 taxes.  It usually means the absence of discriminatory policies that 
treat imported goods less favorably than those of domestic origin.  In its strictest sense it would also include the 
removal of all policies that give any form of assistance to domestic firms, on the principle that the playing field 
was not truly level.  Taken to its extreme, provision of most public goods would be effected, as the quantity, 
quality,  and  method  of  fmancing  of  such  government  activities  undoubtedly  influence  competition.s 
Governments, however, are not likely to buy the argument that a free-trade commercial policy involves giving 
up all domestic sectoral, regional and industrial policies.  In practice, the question is how to constrain policies 
that give a marked incentive to expand the production, or reduce the consumption, of a product of export interest 
to a trading partner. 
b) Policy instruments and market access 
S  If  one adds free trade in services, another set of government regulations could be considered contrary to 
free  trade.  Barriers to  service  trade  are generally of the form  of regulations  on  labor mobility,  rules  of 
establishment, fiduciary control of fmancial services, and other types of regulations usually deemed "domestic." 
9 A classification of policy instruments permits identification of those likely to be of particular relevance 
in free-trade area talks.  For this purpose it is useful to start with a distinction between "coupled" and "decoupled" 
policy instruments.  In this context, a "coupled" policy rewards (or taxes) producers or consumers on the marginal 
unit of production or consumption.  Output or use decisions, therefore, are directly "impacted by the policy.9 
Four combinations of producer and consumer policy types are possible, as shown in Figure 1.  Policies 
that are coupled on the producer side  are likely to cause the most problems for intra-block trade.  These include 
primarily the set of policies that operate at the border, which are coupled to both production and consumption 
decisions.  Policies decoupled on the consumer side include various producer subsidies paid in a way that allows 
market  prices  to  find  their  own  level.  These will be somewhat  less  contentious,  but still  raise  issues  of 
competition among producers.  Producer-decoupled programs include coupled consumer taxes and subsidies, 
which are unlikely to be of major concern in an FTA, and those fully decoupled instruments that do not directly 
affect market price and hence are likely to be broadly acceptable to all of the trading partners.  The main policy 
instruments that fall under these four headings are considered below. 
i)  Border measures 
One would expect the issue of direct trade policies to be the most immediate concern in FTAs.  The 
problem will be apparent as a conflict between protected domestic producers and those wishing to gain access 
to that market through the provisions of the FTA.  • 
The natural focus of negotiations in the case of tariff protection is to agree on a reduction on such tariffs 
on intra-bloc trade, leaving members to run their own external commercial policy.  The tariff reductions can be 
subject to safeguard provisions, which can act to "snap-back" tariffs if imports rise too fast.  In the case of import 
quotas one would  expect the relaxation of quantitative restrictions on partner trade over  a  period of time. 
Domestic pressures will try to influence the time period allowed for adjustment, though this may be unrelated 
to  the  actual  time  n~eded for  such  adjustment.  Firms will be keen  to protect the value  of their  capital 
9  This definition of a coupled policy is less rigorous than others that can be suggested.  For instance, lump 
sum  payments do not affect marginal decisions directly but may be enough to keep a  producer in business, 
borrow to flnance expansion, and choose one product over another. Too strict a deflnition of decoupled policies 
is  probably unconstructive in the context of FTAs: too few policies would qualify,  and the attempt to modify 
national policies could be abandoned. 
10 Figure 1:  Classification of Instruments According to 
Degree of Coupling 
Producer Coupled  Producer Decoupled 
Consumer coupled  Incompatible with FT  A  Likely to be tolerated in FT  As 
Allowed on third-country trade 
-Consumer subsidies 
-Import taxes, levies 
-Storage subsidies 
-Import quotas  (consumer level) 
-Export subsidies 
-Voluntary export restraints 




Consumer decoupled  Likely to be challenged in FT  As  Allowable under FTAs 
as distortion of competition 





-Storage subsidies (producer 
level)  -Set-aside payments 
.  (Ps - Pi) . Q 
Set-aside payments 
(Pi - Pw)'  Q 
(Pi - P  w)' Q  refers to the part of set-aside payments that stimulate output above world prices, 
and (Ps - Pi)' Q  is that part which has no effect on output.  See text for an explanation of these terms. investment; a long transition period preserves for a time the stream of protected receipts and hence presents a 
free fall in asset values. 
Export subsidies are also likely to be objectionable to producer interests in an FrA, on grounds that 
competition is distorted.  Governments in general will have less difficulty reducing export subsidies on intert;lal 
Fr  A  trade, despite the fact  that such subsidies offer protection to producers. 1<1t  is  somewhat easier for an 
industry to claim protection against imports than to argue for export assistance.  Quantitative controls on exports 
within the bloc, such as might be used to keep prices down in times of shortage, can also be outlawed with 
relative ease.  Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) have become a part of the commercial armory of a number 
of countries: it would seem natural that FrA partners remove all VER arrangements between them, perhaps 
after a transition period. 
Among other export-related policies  that are likely to cause problems for  FrAs are home-market 
schemes (where a higher domestic price gives an implicit export subsidy as a result of revenue pooling)  and 
"producer-fmanced" export subsidies, paid from a producer levy rather than from the taxpayer,u  Such policies 
distort competition and will be targets for negotiation.  However, in so far as they are run by marketing boards 
there could be considerable resistance to change. 
This problem of what to do with institutions that run policies counter to an FrA arises also in the case 
of state trading.  A parastatal importer can offer protection without the need for a tariff or explicit quota.  The 
effective quota is the amount imported, which can be less than would have come in under free trade, and the 
implicit tariff revenue is the profit made by reselling on the domestic market.  Export agencies also can influence 
traded quantities, often giving an effective subsidy through trading losses.  A country may be reluctant to give 
up its cherished institutions on account of an FrA: in practice, some accommodation will have to be found to 
10  On occassions an importing country may wish  to keep the advantage of subsidized imports from the 
partner, at the expenses of domestic producer interests.  This could be true, for instance, in the case of Mexican 
attitudes toward US government credit guarantees on sales of dairy and grain products to Mexico. 
11  This instrument should be more properly called a consumer-financed export subsidy, as it can only be 
profitable for the producer to sell more cheaply abroad if the domestic price is raised above the world market 
price. As with the home market scheme, such producer-controlled policies require import restrictions to operate 
and are usually associated with parastatal marketing boards. 
11 prevent conflicts arising within the FI'A from state trading activity. 
ii)  Producer subsidies 
Producer  subsidies  raise  problems  for  FI'  As  only  slightly  less  serious  than  direct  trade  barriers. 
Competitors in other countries are likely to  challenge producer subsidies as  distortive of competition.  The 
economic case for the removal of such subsidies is  not clearcut:  the policies may be desirable responses to 
divergences of a specific national character.  In terms of political economy, the success of the FI'A may hinge 
on the willingness of governments to give up the right to distort competition even when national conditions might 
warrant such policies. 
Deficiency payments are a special breed of producer subsidy,  triggered by  the  relationship between 
market prices and a  pre-set guaranteed price.  They add stability to farm  prices  (if not  incomes)  and are 
generally considered by recipients to be the next best thing to adequ~te market prices.  To give up these policies 
in an FI'A may prove difficult.  It is more likely that attempts would be made to "decouple" such payments, as 
has been done for the purposes of control of domestic spending. 
Storage subsidies  (at the producer level)  pose similar problems, but are in general likely to be less 
provocative: they act to remove surpluses when prices are low and may be deemed helpful to the partner country 
in the FI'A.  The subsidy element in set-aside programs is,  however, likely to be contentious.  Set-asides are 
usually ways of restraining the quantity of output that can benefit from support prices.  They should, therefore, 
be judged as a part of a producer subsidy program.  One can conceptually distinguish between that part of a set-
aside payment that is production-neutral and that which is in effect a production-stimulating subsidy.12  The 
US-Canada Free Trade Agreement attempted to deal with this issue in the context of opening up Canadian 
markets to US grain. 
iii) Consumer subsidies and decoupled programs 
Consumer subsidies are unlikely to generate significant problems within an FI'A, even though they may 
12  If  Ps is the (marginal) support price, P  w the world price, and Pi the price at which the actual output would 
be the same as that with the policy (the "incentive" price), then (Pi - P  w)  is the price incentive and (Ps - Pi) is 
a production-neutral subsidy.  See Carol Bray, Tim Josling and Jay Cherlow "Adjustments for Set-Aside Acres 
in Agricultural Trade Agreements:  An Example from the Canada-US Trade Agreement," Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (forthcoming). 
12 distort competition.  There is enough of a mercantilist flavor to most FI'As to welcome any trade-expanding 
measure.  Schemes that encourage stor~ge (at the wholesale level) in general will also be found unobjectionable. 
Stability from such storage will benefit all partners. 
Similarly benign are programs that are effectively decoupled from  output and consumption decisions, 
such as  food  stamps  (which  act  much as  an income  supplement)  and  crop  insurance  (so  long as  it  is  not 
commodity specific).  Payments per hectare, such as is envisaged in the MacSharry proposal for  the EC, may 
raise some questions in an FI'A, but if  truly decoupled from current output decisions they may have a minimal 
impact on competition.  The decoupled element of  set-aside payments could also be deemed to be non-distorting 
within an FI'A. 
IV. Free Intra-Bloc Trade and Domestic Policy Choice 
The problem of domestic instruments as barriers to market access for FI'  A partners is the focus of most 
attention in free-trade negotiations.  But an equally important issue that has received remarkably little attention 
is the impact of freer intra-bloc trade on the effectiveness of domestic policy instruments that might be used by 
member countries.  What national policies can survive in an FI'A?  On the face of it, members can remove those 
policies that cause the most trade friction within the FI'A and still maintain their individual policies against non-
members.  Figure 2 shows the range of policy instruments where the trade measures apply only to third-country 
trade.  But even if  only the less disruptive policies were allowed to stay, significant changes in their effectiveness 
are apparent.  The feasible  policy  set in  an FI'A is  much smaller once protection against partner trade  is 
removed.  The loss  of policy  effectiveness  can be illustrated by  considering the various instruments in  the 
presence of free partner trade (Figure 2).13 
i)  Third country border instruments 
The problem of disparate tariffs on third country trade among FI'A members is well known.  Trade can 
be "deflected"  through the country with  the lowest  border protection and dilute  the protection in  the other 
13 See the Annex for a more analytical exposition of the impact of partner free trade on the effectiveness 
of policy instruments. 
13 Figure 2: Impact of FTA on Effectiveness of Policy Instruments 
I 
Policy  I 
Impact of FTA 
I 
Tariff on 3rd country imports  tariffs above lowest partner level 
become ineffective 
Quota on 3rd country imports  quotas become ineffective 
Export subsidy on 3rd country trade  subsidies become more expensive 
Voluntary export restraint on 3rd  restraint becomes ineffective 
country trade 
Variable import levy on 3rd country  stability property lost 
trade 
Government financed storage scheme  storage scheme becomes less 
effective 
Quantitative limit on domestic  quota becomes ineffective as price 
marketing or production  raising device 
Deficiency payments  not directly affected: cost may be raised or 
lowered 
Consumer subsidies  not directly affected: cost may be raised or 
lowered 
Crop insurance  not affected 
Hectarage payments  not affected 
Food stamps  not affected countries.  It is normal in FTAs to deal with trade deflection by means of rules of origin.  To qualify as "internal" 
a product must have undergone a substantial transformation (or acquired a particular value added) in the partner 
country.  Unfortunately, this remedy is of limited use for agricultural products.  Rules of origin are meaningless 
for a homogenous good: even if one could trace the origin of a particular bushel of wheat, national supplies are 
fungible.  The low-priced country would import its consumption needs to free up  exports to the high-priced 
market.  Such arbitrage could only be stopped by interfering with intra-bloc trade. 
Similar problems apply  in  the case  of import quotas  on  third country trade.  One country cannot 
effectively maintain such quotas if its partner with free access does not.  Import quotas can be fully effective only 
if "regionalized" to apply to both markets--in effect the introduction of a ·common policy" --just as tariffs will only 
be fully effective if harmonized.  Third-country import policy can still be nominally independent in an FTA, but 
in practice pressures will mount for coordination in the case of homogenous products. 
Export policy fares no better.  An export subsidy (on third country trade) may survive the negotiation 
of an  FTA.  But if there is  free  access into the market of the subsidizing country and supplies are fungible, 
production from the non-subsidizing country will flow to the subsidizing partner and cause the policy to collapse. 
Voluntary export restraints suffer the same fate:  there is  little point in negotiating such restraints with third 
country suppliers at the front door if the back door is open.  Once again, the solution is either common policies 
or the abandonment of the instruments.  Home-market schemes and "producer-financed" export subsidies also 
lose their efficacy in a situation of free partner access, even if restricted to third countries.  The ability of the 
marketing board to operate such schemes is impaired by lack of control of all sources of  supply.  Consumers can 
in effect choose not to subsidize exports: they merely buy partner products. 
Also influenced by the operation of an FTA, as  market access within  the area is  improved,  is  the 
mechanism of the variable levy.  If  one member of the FTA has a fIXed  tariff and another a variable levy, the 
fIXed tariff will come to dominate the levy.  Prices in the country previously protected by the levy will follow the 
world price plus the fLxed  tariffs, with arbitrage among the markets.  Other stability devices (such as variable 
export subsidies) suffer the same fate.  It is difficult for one country to stabilize its market if it has free trade 
with a less stable partner.  Instability will flow accross the border.  This will tend to lead to either a departure 
14 from the FI'A principles or a common stability policy.14  It follows  that storage policies will also either become 
unmanageable (as are partner attempts to stabilize the whole FI'A internal market) or coordinated. Independent 
stability policies will not survive a regional free trade regime. 
ii)  Quantitative controls on production 
The countries within an FI'A may accept that their powers to run independent policies on third country 
trade are de facto restricted:  surely they can run domestic supply control policies to maintain farm incomes. 
Free partner trade will not in itself prevent such production quotas from  operating.  The effectiveness of such 
quotas, however, will be significantly limited.  It is clear both from economic analysis and trade policy practice 
that domestic supply controls need trade measures as support.  If  substitute production can be freely imported 
from  an FI'A partner, the production control will be ineffective  in maintaining price.IS  This is  the reason 
behind the exception in the GA.TT to the rule of "tariffs only" (Article XI), which allows quantitative restrictions 
when domestic production is controlled.  It also lies behind the use of import quotas under Section 22 of the US 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (as amended) which mandates such action in support of domestic policies.  FI'  As 
put to the test the issue of import barriers in support of domestic quotas. 
iii)  Producer and consumer subsidies 
The relationship between FI'A rules on internal trade and the ability to run domestic subsidy programs 
is less clearcut.  Such subsidies could be ruled out on competition grounds, as indicated above.  But those that 
survive might be weakened by the free access provisions of the FI'A.  Essentially, the impact on such policies 
depends  upon  the trend in  market prices.  If freer  trade with  partners reduces  market  prices,  the cost  of 
deficiency payments could increase.  But free trade could also increase market prices, if  export opportunities are 
opened up.  In this case the cost of deficiency payments in an importing country could go down.  Less stable 
market prices, following from the greater market access, will  also cause the cost of such policies to fluctuate. 
14  To the extent that production fluctuations within the FI'A offset each other, stability may be increased 
with free trade among partners. 
15  One could still control production to limit government expenditure.  Political support for such limits could 
erode, however, if  it was clear that no price enhancement was being achieved. 
15 But the market price in the FfA could also be more stable as a result of freer trade.  Consumer policies could 
benefit from more open access to partner supplies: food stamp programs and those that fix maximum prices for 
consumer foods will be less costly to run with lower cost supplies.  In general, if the consumer and producer 
subsidies survive the "competition" test of the FfA, they probably can survive the arbitrage that would follow the 
opening up of market access. 
Decoupling such policies from output decisions was suggested as the response to the competition issue, 
and this would tend to free farm incomes from market prices.  The set of decoupled policies discussed above 
will generally be left unaffected by freer intra-bloc trade.  Crop insurance, hectarage payments (for the reduction 
in price support, tending the land, or abstaining from chemical dependency) and food stamps can all thrive in 
an environment of free trade.  In some cases, there might be higher costs, if  market prices fell  or were more 
unstable, but such extra costs in effect would be compensation for the beneficial impact of lower cost supplies. 
It  is  no  coincidence  that  the same set of policies  are  bein~ proposed  for  the  "green box"  in tIle  GATT 
negotiations.  P.olicies  that  are consistent  with  free  regional  trade  are also  likely  to  be acceptable  at  the 
international level.  This section has argued that they are not only consistent with market access and competition 
needs of an FfA, but also they, almost alone among existing policies, can be run effectively in the presence of 
free trade among partners.  The reinstrumentation of policies towards decoupling and targetting may be the only 
way for farm groups to preserve benefits without facing head-on the movement to regional free trade. 
v. Free-trade and Environmental Policies 
A special case of the impact of freer trade on domestic policy is in the area of environmental, health 
and safety standards (EHS), including the subcategory of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations (SPR). To some 
groups the existence of trade itself poses a threat to the working of these EHS policies.  These groups assume 
that government control is weakened by the movement to regional free trade and that harmonized rules for such 
trade  remove  the accountability  for  environmental  policy  to international bodies.  To others,  these  same 
environmental policies can represent undesirable trade impediments, posing a challenge for  intra-bloc trade 
relations as well as for multilateral rules. 
16 The issue can be treated analytically as involving the aims of  policy, the choice of regulatory mechanisms 
to use, and the point at which the regulations are applied.  Government EHS regulations in the agricultural area 
can be thought of as meeting four needs: a) protection of consumers from unsafe food; b) protection of workers 
from  ~nhealthy working conditions; c) protection of the environment from contamination; and d) protection of 
plants and animals from disease.  Assessment of risks in each of these areas will differ in different countries: the 
challenge for an Fr  A agricultural market is to respect these differences and even to lower the cost of providing 
such protection. 
a)  The compatibility of different EHS standards with free trade 
Freer trade holds out the promise of wider choice and less expensive farm produce for consumers.  It 
also allows food producers to sell to the most remunerative markets.  This will generally lead to an increase in 
trade in agricultural and food  commodities.  But free trade does not imply no domestic regulations on the 
production and sale of foodstuffs.  Consumers will still demand that their food supply, from  what~ver source, 
meet certain standards of quality and safety.  It is  no violation  of free  trade to insist  on these standards. 
Similarly,  countries  and  states  can  legislate  the  method  of production  of agricultural  goods  within  their 
jurisdiction.  Free trade does not imply any loss of control over the regulation of worker health or of the rate 
of depletion of natural resources.  Nor does it imply that countries cannot collaborate to prevent or offset some 
global environmental hazard.  The fact  that each of these legitimate actions has an impact on the pattern of 
trade, and may in certain cases lower the volume of trade, does not mean that trade is thereby distorted.  Indeed, 
it would be a distortion to deny consumers or farm workers their desired health protection, or to overexploit 
natural resources, merely for the sake of expanding trade. 
Not all consumers will demand the same level of government protection from health hazards.  In some 
cases adequate information through labelling and consumer education may be preferred to the prohibition of 
particular ingredients.  The task of policy is to choose some combination of labelling and the regulation of 
particular substances which will maintain consumer choice while preserving public confidence in the food system. 
The combination chosen can well differ by country, or by state or locality, wherever a level of government has 
an obligation to legislate in this area.  Such differences do not in themselves conflict with freer trade.  In the 
17 same way,  countries can have different standards for worker health and different resource depletion policies. 
To the international economy these need to be no more troublesome than different consumer tastes and different 
national production costs.  Indeed, trade in itself can be a valuable response to such national difference, reducing 
the consumer cost of resource-depletion and worker-protection policies and giving producers opportunities to 
meet specific consumer demands. 
If different health and environmental laws are consistent with liberal trade, why  are they a potential 
source  of conflict  in  international affairs?  The answer  lies  in  the way  in  which these laws  are commonly 
formulated and administered.  They become trade barriers when they are administered as border restrictions. 
Economic motives for protection become linked with the operation of the health and environmental standards. 
The  objectives  of public  policy  become  confused  and  the  instruments  become  abused.  Mercantilist  and 
xenophobic political arguments masquerade as sound common sense. 
b) Health standards and FI'  As 
Two trading partners might differ on the issue of the acceptability of a particular chemical residue level 
in food.  The country with the stricter standard will undoubtedly seek to institute controls over imports.  If  that 
country chooses to regulate its own producers, it will have to test goods from abroad to ensure compliance with 
the same standards.  The act of inspecting goods at the border is  the cause of most complaints arising from 
different national consumer standards.  Producers in other countries feel that they have no say in the way in 
which the regulations are imposed.  They fear discrimination with good cause: there are countless examples of 
the use of health standards to keep a little more of the domestic market for local producers.  The consumer gets 
some protection, but pays in higher costs for the produce, to the net disadvantage of the economy as a whole. 
But the same two  trading partners, instead might differ on the health hazards of particular farming 
practices, such as the use of pesticides, on farm workers.  In this case the regulations may put the producers in 
the stricter country at a  disadvantage in the marketplace.  Their ability  to compete on both domestic and 
international markets will be impaired.  Similar effects may be felt from different policies on resource depletion 
and on animal welfare.  Producers will often be tempted to argue for economic protection to counter their cost 
disadvantage.  In this way a trade barrier may arise as a result of different production standards.  The producer 
18 protection from  the economic implications of stricter production standards will again come at a cost  to  the 
consumer and to the economy as a whole. 
c)  Is there a way of reducing this cause of trade tensions? 
The best hope for  removing  the  temptation to  use  health standards  as  trade restrictions  is  to  de-
emphasize action at the border.  Enforcement of any particular pesticide-residue limit should be carried out on 
all foodstuffs regardless of origin.  In general, this would imply testing at the wholesale level, where imported 
and domestic goods merge.  Control over method of production would no longer be an appropriate way  of 
enforcing  this  consumer  standard,  though  there  might  still  be  controls  to  comply  with  worker-health  and 
environmental regulations.  Production methods would in effect become self-regulated: all producers (domestic 
and foreign) would have an incentive to produce goods that would pass the test at the wholesale level.  And 
domestic producers would  be free  to  use  different  production  methods for  other, less regulated,  consumer 
markets.  Most importantly, the  absence of any border controls would  reduce the  possibility of granting an 
economic advantage to domestic producers and remove the possibility of challenges from trading partners.  The 
GATT principle of "national treatment" for imports (i.e., no discrimination within the country on the basis of 
origin) would be applied, and as no border intervention would be needed, there would be no need for recourse 
to the Article XX exemption. 
Does the same hold true for different production standards, designed to protect worker-health or animal 
welfare, or different policies to control resource depletion?  If  no border restrictions apply, it is much less likely 
that such policies will be viewed as trade issues.  Other countries will reach their own decisions on the use of 
their resources and the standards they set for worker safety.  The removal of the temptation to use trade policy 
instruments to influence such decisions will improve conditions in international trade. 
Many regulations governing standards and grading practices are incorporated in marketing orders and 
other devices operated under national or state (provincial) legislation.  These marketing orders often appear to 
those excluded to be instruments of protection.  Designed to encourage "orderly" marketing, they are often easy 
to transform into a way to favor domestic producers.  Free trade based on national treatment must include equal 
access to decisions taken on grading and quality standards.  The existence of marketing orders is not inconsistent 
19 with free bilateral (or multilateral) trade; their practices may have to be changed to remove the opportunity for 
rent seeking. 
Under what conditions might it be necessary to retain border controls?  Some health problems arise 
directly from the transmission of  goods across borders.  In particular, plant and animal diseases are often spread 
through trade.  In this case, intervention at the border is often the best way to prevent the spread of disease. 
Free trade will always be subject to the qualification that unwanted pathogens should not accompany the traded 
products.  It may not be possible to avoid all cases of economic protectionism taking advantage of such sanitary 
and phytosanitary import restrictions.  But the problem will be minimized if the regulations are clearly cast in 
terms of the objective of disease control.  This will normally imply differentiation of the regulation by place of 
origin, as areas of endemic disease do not always correspond to national boundaries. 
d)  International talks on EHS standards 
If  different standards are compatible with free trade, is there any point in trying to harmonize them? 
The answer depends on how different the standards are and on why they are different.  Many national standards 
for health and safety developed in a period when trade was much less widespread.  Differences in the standards 
among countries have often arisen not from different risk assessment but from different ways of doing the same 
thing.  Under these circumstances, the cost of production and marketing could be reduced with no loss of 
consumer safety by harmonization of standards.  The use of international standards, such as those from  the 
Codex Alimentarius, the International Office of Epizootics and the International Plant Protection Convention, 
seems  appropriate for  this  purpose.  But  acceptance  of such  standards  should  not  imply  that  additional 
regulations cannot be enforced in particular markets, so long as the rule of "national treatment" was applied. 
In the same way,  regulatory authorities often differ in the way they test for safety and in the stage of 
the production and marketing chain at which the regulations apply.  There may be considerable savings  (in 
retesting) and a greater transparency in the market if regulatory authorities could establish the "equivalence" of 
different  tests.  An attempt to ensure equivalence of different  tests is  a  part of the agenda in the GAIT 
discussions, and the concept of "mutual recognition of testing systems" (as opposed to mutual recognition of 
standards) has long been a feature of OECD industry agreements on standards.  But this issue itself would be 
20 Figure 3:  Appropriate Type of Control for Meeting EHS Concerns 
Concern  Production Externality  Consumption  Trading Externality 
Externality 
Water Pollution  PPM - taxes/subsidies 
Worker Safety  PPM - training 
Countryside Amenity  PPM - taxes/subsidies 
Food Safety  Product Standards 
Recipes 
Labeling 
Plant Disease  PPM  Border Tests: 
Animal Health  PPM  quarantine 
Animal Welfare  PPM  Border Tests: 
quarantine 
PPM =  "Production and Processing Method" Regulation less important if the instruments of control were moved from the border: one would no longer be dependent 
upon knowledge of other the testing proceedure in other countries.  If  testing for consumer safety were done 
at the wholesale leve~ for instance, the equiValency of tests at earlier stages in the production/marketing process 
would no longer be an issue.  Tests for worker health and environmental impacts will remain the responsibility 
of local and national authorities. If  the distinction between worker-health and consumer-safety issues is properly 
established, "equivalency"  of tests designed to control these different  externalities is  no longer a meaningful 
concept.  Border inspection becomes necessarily only in the case where animal and plant pests and diseases can 
cross phytosanitary and sanitary boundaries. 
e)  How might such policies work in practice? 
This dilemma is  at the crux of the discussion on sanitary and phytosanitary measures in  the GA  TI 
negotiations.  The GA  TI is not a body that sets health and environmental standards.  Instead, it tries to promote 
more liberal trade by agreeing to a set of rules on the conduct of trade policy that will avoid costly conflicts. 
The GA  TI articles recognize the validity of national standards and health regulations.  Article XX is specific 
in exempting such national regulations from challenge as trade barriers.  The issue under discussion in Geneva 
is not whether such an exemption exists but under what circumstances can one claim such an exemption. If  there 
are no limits on the ability of governments to claim exemption on the grounds of health and safety, arbitrary and 
unfair acts of protection will continue. 
These matters can be illustrated with reference to European and US-Canada experiences.  The problem 
of disparate health and safety standards in food and agricultural production is one of the most contentious facing. 
the negotiators in the NAFrA talks.  Some limited attempts have been made in the Canada-US FTA to reduce· 
trade frictions, but the issue was essentially left to discussions in the GATI.  Earlier talks between the US and 
MeXico, under the framework approach, have progressed on questions of plant health.  But many sticky issues 
remain.  As US opposition  to the NAFrA negotiations has highlighted  food  standards and  environmental 
pollution as key issues, they will have to be addressed in even a modest agreement.  The formulation of such an 
agreement is likely to focus on the need to improve adherence to existing regulations in Mexico and making 
those regulations conform with practices in the US. 
21 The issue is broader than that posed by the formation of FI'  As.  The GATT negotiations have raised 
the same question and are moving toward a closer defmition of the appropriate conditions under which trade 
barriers may be used in support of health and safety standards.  The European Community has dealt with these 
problems in its quest for a border-free internal market.  And bilateral discussions between the EC and the US 
have also tried to resolve trade conflicts such as that arising from EC legislation banning the use of hormones 
in animal feed.  The US and other countries are engaged in a process of revising several aspects of domestic 
policy to accord with the realities of the global marketplace.  Adjustment of health and safety standards and of 
environmental and resource depletion policies are examples of this process.  The European Community has had 
to face  up to  these issues in  the framework  of its  -1992- program for  a  single internal market.  The tight 
timetable and the political imperative to make compromises have forced the pace of legislation.  The prospect 
of a border-free Community by  1993  has  made  it  essential  to decide  on ways  in which  individual  country 
preferences could be kept without giving scope to national protectionism.  The way in which the EC is going 
about this process has lessons for other countries. 
The treaty establishing the European Community left the issue of protecting health and safety in the 
hands of national governments.  It was  recognized, however, that the operation of national legislation could 
distort trade.  For years the Commission, the body charged with initiating legislation, sought to harmonize such 
national regulations, with little success.  The breakthrough came in the late 1970s, when the European Court, 
whose job it is to enforce the Treaty, ruled that arbitrary use of standards to give economic advantage was not 
legal.  The notion that countries had to practice -mutual recognition- of each others standards, when no danger 
to health was involved, has been a powerful one in freeing up intra-EC trade.  Harmonization of legislationm 
~  is no longer a focus of attention.  In a borderless European Community, a producer will no longer have to 
~ 
meet a dozen different sets of standards to sell into the markets of other member states.  Only for the control 
of animal and plant disease will produce movement across internal borders be monitored, and that will be limited 
to movement between regions with different disease incidence.  Even this latter program is  under the control 
of  the Commission, rather than the individual countries, and is temporary until certain diseases can be eradicated. 
It is unlikely that other countries will be able to move at the speed of the Community to the de-emphasis 
22 of border controls, but the experiment does have useful lessons.  Local control over health and safety issues is 
not incompatible with a border-free internal market.  Negotiations on harmonization of legislation need not be 
the focus  of improving trade relations.  Mutual recognition of the standards of others could improve  trade 
opportunities without undermining essential public health controls. And policies that require international action, 
such  as  those  to  avoid  the  spread  of disease  and  those  that  relate  to  cross-border  pollution,  are  more 
appropriately taken at the international level. 
f)  Summary 
Disparate health and safety standards in different countries (  or states) do not of themselves distort trade: 
the way in which they are operated, however, tends to lead to discrimination and trade conflicts.  Such trade 
conflicts can be minimized by the appropriate type of policy well-focused on the problem area. 
Consumer food safety standards should be applied within the border and without discrimination as to 
source.  If  other countries followed this procedure, domestic produce would be able to compete in a number of 
overseas markets.  Some countries might  choose  a less  restrictive standards than others:  in these markets, 
domestic producers would not be hampered by having to meet the higher standards they face on the domestic 
market.  Negotiations to remove arbitrary differences and hence to permit lower-cost marketing would continue. 
Production and processing methods should be regulated according to the needs and standards of the 
country in which the production or processing takes place.  This should not be tied to the consumer standards, 
nor be differentiated by destination. Strict regulations may seem to inhibit economic opportunities for producers. 
But if they are deemed to be necessary, that  opportu~ty is only an illusion.  Regulation of business in one 
country to correct a "global" problem does, however, represent lost income: such problems can only be solved 
by cooperative policies among group~ of countries.  Unilateral action usually involves a heavy loss with little or 
no gain. 
It follows  that any legislation attempting to cover production methods, environmental pollution, and 
consumer safety issues needs very careful crafting.  In political terms there may be some links between these 
topics: sound public policy would recognize the. very different objectives involved.  This might imply that they be 
addressed by separate instruments and even that they be negotiated in separate places.  Unless such an issue 
23 separation  can  be  achieved,  conflicts  will  continue  to  arise  from  the  clash  of national  health  and  safety 
regulations. 
VI. Free-trade Areas and World Markets 
The fmal  set of issues relates to the links between the mtra-bloc treatment of agricultural trade and 
policies  and the situation on world markets.  Among the analytical  issues in  this  context are the impact of 
regional free trade on world market price levels and stability; the conditions under which trade diversion may 
impact countries not  part of trade blocs;  the extent to which  regional solutions  assist  in  the negotiation  of 
multilateral  rules;  and the  importance  of multilateral  rules  for  guiding  the  conduct  of inter-bloc  trade  in 
agriculture. 
These questions do not have a straightforward answer.  The significance of the treatment of agriculture 
within an FTA on outsiders depends on a number of factors.  Paramount among these are protection levels in 
the FT  A countries and the trade balances of the participants.  Before looking at the issue of actual trade blocs 
and their impact, some clarification of the expected direction of that impact is  useful.  At the  risk  of some 
tiresome taxonomy, this is attempted below. 
a) Different types of FTAs 
The range of different trade outcomes can be seen by imagining four typical countries, each a candidate 
for a two-country FTA (see Figure 4).16  Countries A and B are protectionist, one an exporter and the other 
an importer, while Countries C and D are a liberal importer and exporter, respectivelyP  One can therefore 
16  The discussion  of this  section  is  limited  to  two-country FTAs,  ie.  bilateral  trade agreements.  The 
taxonomy would quickly get tedious if  all possible multilateral arrangements were to be included.  However, the 
results from the two-country examples are illustrative of the range of possibilities in the multicountry cases.  It 
is additionally assumed that all partners have roughly equal weight in the formation of the FTA.  Obviously, a 
dominant partner could impose the agenda and defme the trade concerns of an unbalanced FTA.  A particular 
. form of bilateral agreement is the "hub-and-spoke" model, where a large "hub" country (say the US, the EC or 
Japan) negotiates individual bilateral agreements with a number of  smaller countries, which mayor may not have 
any preferential access to each other's markets. It is tempting to see the hub-and-spoke system as merely a series 
of independent bilaterals, but as seen from the hub the arrangements are more like a multicountry FTA. 
17  The terms exporter and importer refer to the trade balance for a particular commodity.  The comments 
on internal and external problems should be interpreted accordingly. 
24 Figure 4:  Categorization of Possible FTAs by Trade Regime and Trade Balance 
Type of Country  Trade Regime  Trade Balance  Examples 
A  Protectionist  Importer  Japan, ROK 
B  Protectionist  Exporter  EC, US, Canada 
C  Liberal  Importer  Mexico, Chile 
D  Liberal  Exporter  New Zealand, Australia 
Type ofFTA  Internal Problems  Trade Creation  Trade Diversion 
a) Likeminded FTAs 
AA  concern over deflection  no  no 
BB  concern over subsidies  no  no 
AB  conflicts over access  yes  yes 
CC  no internal problems  no  no 
DD  no internal problems  no  no 
CD  no internal problems  no  no 
b) Contrarian FT  As 
~-
~ 
AC  concern over deflection  yes  no 
AD  conflicts over access  yes  no 
BC  concern over subsidies  no  yes 
BD  no conflicts  no  yes derme  six "likeminded" FrAs, which  match either protectionist countries together or involve  only those with 
liberal.trade policies.  In each case one can ask what internal problems are likely and what might be the outside 
interest.  Internal problems are most likely among the protectionist FrAs.  Two high-priced importers (an AA 
FrAin Figure 4)  will tend to have conflicts over trade deflection, each cautious about weakening their own 
internal market price.  One would expect the protection levels in these countries to move together over time as 
a way to avoid such problems.  It is also likely that pressures will mount to free up internal trade.  This could 
cause  the bloc as a whole  to move  toward lower levels  of protection, and some  trade creation could  occur. 
Significant trade diversion is inherently unlikely in markets where both countries are importers, but the lowering 
of support levels could have some beneficial impact on third countries.I8  An alliance between two high-priced 
exporters (a BB FrA in Figure 4) may also lead to internal conflicts, this time over the level of subsidies in each 
member, and there might be pressures to reduce such subsidies.  However, there is no clear presumption that 
any significant trade creation or diversion.will occur as a result of pressures within the FrA. 
Trade impacts on the rest of the world are more likely if  the partners have different· trade interests and 
commodity balances.  A protectionist importer and a high-cost exporter (an AB FrA) will undoubtedly try to 
expand internal trade, at the behest of the exporter, though the importer will try to resist this pressure.  Trade 
expansion will tend to be positive for agricultural markets, but the main benefits will be captured by the exporting 
partner.  Trade diversion is likely to swamp any positive impacts from freer FrA access.  Free trade agreements 
among "liberal" countries (CC,DD and CD FrAs) are likely to be relatively benign.  With low trade barriers and 
few  export subsidies, and with price levels  close to world market levels,  the internal improvement in  market 
access will have little effect on collective balances with the rest of the world. 
A different set of responses can be expected if  protectionist and liberal countries are thrown together 
in  an FrA.  These "contrarian" FrAs are likely to  have  somewhat different.approaches to the inclusion  of 
18  The analytics of trade creation and trade diversion,  and its interpretation in non-tariff situations, is 
discussed in the Annex.  Trade creation is usually dermed as an increase in imports in the importing partner: 
trade diversion refers to the switch in the source of supplies away from third country trade.  In the present 
context, trade creation can be taken to mean a reduction in protection levels as a result of the FrA and trade 
diversion as a reduction in demand by the FrA from the rest of the world (or an increase in supplies).  Thus 
trade creation raises "world" prices and trade diversion lowers them. 
25 agriculture in intra-bloc free trade.  A protectionist importer paired with a liberal importer (an AC FrA) will 
be primarily concerned with trade deflection through the liberal partner's markets.  Agriculture may well be left 
out of the agreement, as a way of avoiding this problem.  A protectionist importer paired with a liberal exporter 
(an AD FrA) will be more likely to include agriculture in the FrA agreement. The exporting partner will argue 
for  more liberal access and lower prices in the importer as a condition of membership.19  Trade creation is 
likely, but third countries may gain little: the improved access would go to the exporting partner, as envisaged 
in the intra-bloc trade deal.  A  liberal importer paired with  a  protectionist  exporter  (a BC FrA) will  be 
concerned over the level of  subsidies employed by its high-priced partner. Competition rules are likely to be high 
on the internal agenda.  However, internal trade may not increase, and the main impact could be on third 
country trade, if  the liberal importer becomes a "trojan horse" for reduction in internal prices in the exporter. 
In this case there would be negative trade "diversion" which would be positive for world markets as subsidized 
exports were reduced.  Protectionist exporters paired with liberal exporters (a BD FrA) also could catch a dose 
of liberalism, as the process of arbitrage weakens the ability of the high cost producer to dump on world markets. 
b) Regional trade and world markets 
This set of possibilities would suggest that the impact on any third country is crucially dependent on the 
nature of the countries forming the FrA.  It is useful to consider some of the major commodity markets and 
the situation in existing trade blocs and regions discussing such arrangements.  This is attempted in Figure 5, 
which indicates in summary form the net balance of some of the major (mainly developed country) trade groups. 
The major trade problems of agricultural markets are represented in this matrix.  The EC, North and South 
America, and Australasia are net exporters of wheat, seeking access into somewhat protected markets in East 
Asia (and in other regions not m  the Figure).  It follows that the wheat market is not likely to be benefited by 
alliances between low-cost exporters (as in NAFTA) and only somewhat indirectly by an FrA between the EC 
19  The issue of a liberal exporter joining an already established union between protectionist importers is of 
some interest.  Will the exporter be able to change the trade stance of the importers?  Or will the exporter be 
content to turn protectionist, knowing that the siz!: of the "home" market will be increased by such a policy?  The 
Netherlands  faced  this  dilemma when  it  joined the Belgium  Luxembourg Economic Union  (to form  the 
BENELUX .union) in the immediate post war period. 
26 Figure 5:  Commodity Balance and Regional Trade Blocs 
Commodity  South  North  European  EFTA and  East Asia  Australia & 
America  America  Community  EE  (inc Japan)  New Zeal. 
Wheat  +  +  +  =  - + 
Rice  =  +  =  - +/- = 
Corn  +  +  +/- - - = 
Oilseeds  +  +  - - - = 
Dairy  =  =/- +  +  - + 
Meat  +  =  +/- +  - + 
Sugar  +  - +  =  - + 
Fruits and  +  +  - - - + 
Vegetables 
Ke .  y:  +  mdlcates e  xp ort sur )lus  p 
- indicates import deficit 
=  indicates approximate self-sufficiency 
/- indicates import possibility with lower protection and other European countries.20  If  East Asia joined with either Australasia or North America (or even South 
America),  one might  expect  some net liberalization of world trade.  But most of the improved access  into 
protected  importer  markets  would  be  reserved  for  partner  suppliers.  The  key  relationship  between  the 
competitive exporters and those who export with large subsidies looks unlikely to be resolved in the context of 
The situation for rice is somewhat similar, since the East Asian market holds the key.  In this case, the 
key relationship would be between the US and Japan.  If  free trade were proposed between the two, the issue 
of rice would have to be faced.  Any liberal solution to this problem would have world market benefits, even if 
the US rice producers get the major benefit.  Corn trade into Asia is less restricted.  In this case only a US-EC 
free  trade  compact  is  likely  to  have  major  impacts  on world  markets,  although  internal  impacts  of FI'A 
arrangements could be significant for com-consuming economies.22  Oilseed markets are also likely to be only 
affected by free trade agreements between the US and the EC, although freer trade in oilseeds between South 
America and the EC would have an impact on world prices. 
The situation is somewhat different for dairy products and meats, where the US is not a major exporter. 
In the case of dairy,  it is  not easy to see an FI'  A putting significant pressure on dairy protection in the EC, 
except as a result of some EFI'A surpluses.  Australia and New Zealand once had an FI'A with the UK, which 
stimulated beef, sheep, and dairy exports to that country.  New Zealand has special access still in that market. 
But nothing like a free-trade pact between the EC and Australasia is likely to bring relief to the dairy market. 
The beef and sheepmeat markets could be helped by regional free trade agreements, as between Australasia and 
East Asia. 
Sugar is one of the few commodities in which regional free trade could take significant pressures off the 
20  An exception could be increases in wheat exports from Argentina to Brazil, as a result of a bilateral 
between those twop countries. See Barry Krissoff and Jerry Sharples ·Preferential Trading Arrangements: Wheat 
Trade in Western Hemisphere Countries,· (mimeo) 1992. 
21  It seems safe to assume that in any FI'A between the US and the EC, the Community would ask for an 
exclusion of agricultural trade.  Inclusion of such trade would have major repercussions for other countries. 
22  This is particularily true of Mexico in the context of the NAFr  A, where inclusion of com as an item to 
be liberalized will have major impacts on the rural economy. 
27 international market.  In particular, the US market could expand to absorb exports from the Caribbean, Central 
and South America.  At present, trade policy is  designed to protect the workings of'  domestic price support 
systems.  If  this protection were removed in regional negotiations (or in the GAIT), there would be benefits to 
world markets.23  Similar benefits could be achieved in some fruit and vegetable markets, where regional trade 
flows are both complementary and significant in terms of world trade.  The trade relationships between the EC 
and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, and between the US and Central and South America, each have 
the potential for impacting the world markets for certain fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Beyond these commodity-specific effects, the most important link between FTAs and world agricultural 
markets is the impact on national domestic policies.  At present the trade implication of such policies is being 
discussed in the GAIT Uruguay Round.  The relationship between the regional trade talks  and the GAIT 
Round is discussed in the next section. 
VII.  Current Negotiations on FT  As and the Place of Agriculture 
a)  Prospects for further agricultural integration in Europe 
The roadblock  to  the incorporation  of agricultural  trade  in  the general  liberalization  of internal 
European markets is  not so much the existence as the form of the CAP.  So long as  the internal market is 
characterised by high prices, supported by variable levies and export subsidies, it is difficult to see any way of 
granting liberal access to Eastern Europe.  The extension of the protective wall of the variable levy,  and the 
assurance of open-ended export subsidies, to EFTA and Eastern Europe would encourage massive investment 
in the Community directed towards products which are already in surplus.  High stable prices may look attractive 
to farmers in the new member states, but they exacerbate the resource allocation problems already serious in 
the EC.  It is  doubtful whether the Community can afford to admit new members at the high  price levels 
currently achieved by the CAP. 
The CAP  might  be transformed  into  a  series  of regionally-differentiated  compensation  payments, 
23  See Steven Neff and Timothy Josliog, Economic Effects of  Removing US Dairy and Sugar Import Quotas, 
NCFAP Discussion Paper No FAP 92-01, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., 1991. 
28 shielded by a  modest and declining external tariff.  The situation then would look vastly  different.  EFfA 
countries will come in with their own set of compensation payments, with a straightforward transitional period 
to Community fmancing.  Tariffs on third-country trade can easily be harmonised over the same transition period. 
Eastern European countries need not erect trade barriers as a part of  joining the Community: they could benefit 
at  once  from  lower  food  prices  and open  access  to EC markets.  Compensation  payments  might  still  be 
necessary, in cases where farm prices are now high, but no market-rigging intervention systems would have to 
be introduced. 
A year ago, such a prospect would have seemed a pipe-dream.  The CAP has sucessfully resisted radical 
reform for twenty-five years.  But the recent proposals from  the European Commission for a drastic reform of 
the CAP go precisely along these lines.  Under the MacSharry plan, significant price cuts (55 percent, over three 
years, in the case of cereals) would be offset by compensation payments to farmers.24  Support payments per 
ton, the implied basis of support under present policies, would in effect be replaced by payments per hectare, 
by the subtle device of paying compensation for prices cuts on the basis of an average yield.  There is still lively 
debate on the precise method of calculating the payments, but any basis other than current yield and acreage 
(as is implied, say, by a deficiency payment program) would partially decouple payments from output. The stated 
objective of the MacSharry plan is to reduce surpluses and to encourage more extensive farming systems, while 
keeping up incomes in rural areas.2S  The most significant effect may be to make the CAP, and hence the 
Community, expandible. 
b) NAFf  A and agricultural integration 
Against this  backdrop, it is possible to pose the main questions faced  by those responsible for  the 
24  See  Commission  of the  European  Communities,  The  Development  and  Future  of the  Common 
Agricultural Policy, COM(91)258, July 1991.  The plan also calls for acreage set-asides for larger farmers, with 
limited compensation for lost output.  This set-aside scheme has more political than economic significance. 
2S  One implication of the per-hectare compensation scheme based on average regional yield is that support 
is redistributed from the high-yield farmers to those with lower-than-average yields.  This has led many to argue 
that the plan would reward inefficiency.  Of course, it is an empirical question whether the high- or the low-yield 
farmers  use  resources  more efficiently.  See T Josling and  A.Marian~ "The  Distributional  and Efficiency 
Implications of the MacSharry Proposals," (mimeo) 1991. 
29 agricultural component of the. NAFTA talks.26  One can identify various stages on the way  toward the  full 
integration of agricultural markets in North America.  These stages indicate the nature of the choice facing the 
negotiators: how far to proceed down the path toward a true common market.  At the risk of oversimplification, 
three such steps can be distinguished along the road to regional trade liberalization.  These include a modest 
first step, which would tackle a limited number of trade issues brought up by the participants; a somewhat more 
imaginative stage designed to encourage sectoral integration in North American agriculture; and an even more 
ambitious venture into the realm of free trade, free investment, and a degree of policy coordination. These three 
stages are discussed before taking a look at the relationship between the agricultural part of the NAFT  A talks 
and the process of multilateral and unilateral trade lIberalization. 
i. Removing Trade Irritants 
The first step is to negotiate a modest agreement that includes a reduction oftariff barriers and focusses 
primarily  on  trade  irritants,  those  aspects  of  ~~.:~  c:ountry's  policy  to  which  others  particularly  object. 
Unfortunately, such solutions to these trade problems are likely to be somewhat ad hoc.  As many of the irritants 
arise from  the rapid growth of trade rather than its absence, the solutions may on occasions lead away from 
liberalization and market integration. 
Agricultural trade would be partially liberalized by such an agreement.  Tariff barrier reduction would 
occur, subject to snapbacks and other safeguards, but non-tariff measures would be reduced by negotiation rather 
than by rule or as  a  matter of principal.  The negotiation mode would be "request  and  offer"  rather than 
agreements on rules.  This is essentially the procedure being undertaken at the moment in  the NAFTA talks. 
The three countries have exchanged lists of tariffs and identified non-tariff measures in partner countries that 
can be negotiated down.  There is reason to believe that an agreement can be reached on the basis of such a 
process.  Though  apparently  modest,  such  a  step  would  still  go  further  than  the  European  Free Trade 
Association  (EFTA), which  has  chosen  for  thirty years  to exclude  agriculture,  fish,  and  forestry  products 
altogether from its free trade provisions. 
26 These questions are described in more detail in Timothy E. Josting, "Agriculture in the NAFTA: Issues 
and Options," (mimeo), 1991. 
30 ii. Moving Toward Sectoral Integration 
The tariffs-plus-trade-irritants model for NAFTA would, however, fall some way short of a progressive 
integration of the agricultural markets in the three countries.  More in keeping with the longer run objectives 
of liberal trade policy is to take a second step, that of sectoral integration in agriculture. This move would include 
an agreement to open the border for farm products; an attempt to ensure harmonized, compatible or mutually 
recognized  safety  and  quality  standards;  and  a  movement  toward  domestic  policies  to  take  advantage  of 
complementarities rather than perpetuating the segmentation of the market.  Inevitably this would mean in many 
cases the adaptation of Mexican policies and procedures to accord with US and Canadian practices. 
Private sector integration in agriculture across the US-Mexico border has proceeded apace for  many 
years.  Labor flows and capital investments have accompanied goods movements.  The chief characteristic of a 
"sectoral integration" stage in the development of the North American market is that governments attempt to 
make such private sector activities easier.  This, of course, implies· the reduction of tariff barriers in the initial 
stage, but a different approach would need to be taken for the other trade impediments.  Trade barriers would 
be identified that impeded market access and cross-border investment.  If overriding political considerations 
precluded  quick  liberalization,  a  timetable  would  be set out  for  eventual  implementation.  Trade remedy 
provisions, that allow for contingent protection from imports, would be similarily circumscribed.  The aim would 
be to create a climate where businesses could make investments and satisfy markets without the fear that their 
success would be penalised by the introduction of restrictions.  Negotiations would also have to address directly 
the issues posed by domestic policy differences, not least in the agricultural area.  There is little indication that 
the negotiators are contemplating taking this second step at this time. 
iii. Moving toward Common Policies 
A  third stage would imply sectoral integration in  goods and factor  markets and supplementing the 
integrated market with the development of common policies for the agricultural sector.  These policies need not 
be of an interventionist nature.  They would include the adoption of single regulations and standards where 
appropriate.  It is likely that closer integration of markets will over time increase the need for common policy 
instruments, common support levels, and common external policies.  Although it is doubtful whether the political 
31 and institutional basis for such policies exists at present, it is still useful to derme this step to clarify the choices 
open to negotiators.  Moreover, under certain conditions it may be possible to gain the benefits of common 
approaches to policy issues without the need for political integration or common institutions.  The process of 
negotiation itself may open up possibilities to push beyond the "free trade area" stage in economic integration. 
This third stage of integration for  the agricultural sector needs to be identified not so much for  its 
immediate practicability but to provide a conceptual framework into which to place more limited agreements. 
Both for those who would welcome a true North American Common Market and others who would shrink from 
such a prospect, there is the need to know how far down that road the NAFr  A talks are travelling.  The move 
from independent sectoral economic policies to commonly articulated policies is a landmark on that road. 
The European Community is presently the only regional trade grouping that has explored this territory. 
Driven by visions  of political union  and facilitated  by  common institutions, EC member states have  shifted 
responsibility for both foreign  commercial policy and  domestic market regulation to the Community level.27 
At present the EC is attempting the feat of accumulating economic policy controls at the center while retaining 
cultural, social, health, education, and internal security responsibilities at the national level.  These affluent and 
sovereign  countries seem prepared to  explore  the  sharing of responsibilities  for  economic policy:  it  is  not 
impossible that common economic policies might eventually reach the North American agenda. 
c) The GAIT and FTAs 
The significance of a GAIT deal for regional free-trade talks is that it addresses the same set of issues, 
focussing  on the distortive impact on  trade flows  of instruments designed  for  domestic farm  price support. 
Within global trade as in a free trade area, export subsidies pose particular problems.  Non-tariff barriers and 
coupled domestic subsidies are at the root of international trade problems.  The currently proposed GAIT 
solution to such problems would make life a whole lot easier for free-trade areas.  Moving to tariffs as the main 
import barrier makes the issue of freer internal trade much more tractable.  Of course, there will still be losers 
27  This process has undoubtedly been helped by the relative homogeneity of economic conditions in much 
of the EC, allowing common policies to operate across the Community.  The poorer southern countries were 
enabled to join in part by generous financial transfers and long transition periods.  It remains to be seen whether 
the same conditions will apply if  the Community is expanded to include some of the eastern european countries. 
32 from  internal trade liberalization, but a  long  transition period with  safeguards can  always  be negotiated if 
necessary.  A global agreement to phase down export subsidies immediately removes the pressure from the need 
to negotiate on these matters regionally.  And a series of GAIT-acceptable decoupled payments in  lieu  of 
present high price supports gives a neat way to avoid the issue of different support prices within regional trade 
blocs.  The payment of such trade-neutral subsidies could be allowed to continue on a national basis, to reflect 
the "divergent social economic and environmental conditions" among the members of the free-trade area.  The 
GAIT formula  of tariffs  and  decoupled  payments  is  the  only  way  (short  of total  liberalization)  to  make 
agricultural policies consistent with the development of regional trade blocs without common policies. 
The timing of an agreement in the parallel discussions in the Uruguay Round on new rules to govern 
agricultural trade in the GAIT, however, is  crucial to both the NAFTA talks and to discussions in  Europe. 
Many of the objectives of freer North American trade in agricultural products w<?uld  have been assisted by a 
more speedy resolution of the GAIT talks.  But the US, Canada and Mexico have had to proceed without the 
certainty of a firm  GAIT pact.  This uncertainty translates into a shifting agenda for  the NAFT  A  talks and 
changes the probabilities of the outcomes described above. 
A  favorable  outcome to the GAIT Round would doubtless  provide  som~ momentum for  a  more 
ambitious NAFTA  Under these conditions, plans for sectoral integration would appear to be more realistic. 
A good GAIT outcome on agriculture that included a commitment for  steady reductions of support levels, 
combined with a movement toward tariffs for import protection and the elimination of export subsidies, would 
make the integration of North American agricultural markets much easier.  Mexico could continue to tariffy its 
import regime under the GAIT agreement, avoiding the impression of being forced to do so by the US. The 
US could drop its export subsidies on farm products to Mexico, thus reducing the potential for market disruption 
without appearing to be acting to reduce trade.  If  the GAIT pact included minimum access guarantees, new 
trade opportunities in all three countries would be opened up.  Making domestic price support policies less trade 
distorting,  through the traffic-light system, would reduce regional as well  as global trade tensions.  And as 
support levels came down over ~ transition period, a raft of smaller trade problems would be eased. 
A weak GAIT outcome could signal a more limited approach to regional problems.  The "modest" 
33 NAFrA option, with an emphasis on solving bilateral problems, requires little in the way of a successful GATT 
Round outcome or any  further  degree of liberaIization on the domestic front.  Indeed, it  would have  been 
possible even if the US Congress were to have denied the administration an extension of fast-track authority. 
A slow-track negotiation would almost certainly have led to a piece-meal approach to trade liberaIization.  It is 
possible that even with the fast-track authority, congressional sensitivities will force the US administration to 
negotiate along these lines.  High-level trade-offs, necessary for a commitment to liberaIization, are hampered 
by the need to consult Congress at every turn.  A poor GAIT outcome would cause Congressional scrutiny of 
a NAFfA pact to be even more exhaustive. 
An outright failure in the GATT could cause a burst of enthusiasm for bilateral trade processes and 
might seem to make a more ambitious NAFrA possible.  But such an outcome, even though it might give a 
rhetorical boost to bilateral ideas, will pose significant additional problems for agriculture in the NAFr  A talks. 
In effect, all the desirab1e developments. under discussion in Geneva would have to be translated to the NAFr  A 
agenda.  Though it might seem to be much easier to find common ground on farm trade policy improvements 
among the US, Canada, and Mexico -- in particular, now that Mexico broadly supports the GATT position of 
the Cairns Group -- than with the EC and Japan, it  is  not clear that this could easily be put into a NAFr  A 
agreement.  Objectives that look desirable at a multilateral level may lose some appeal on a regional basis. 
Without the promise of higher sales to Japan and the EC, the US and Canada may rapidly lose enthusiasm for 
tariffication and export subsidy reductions in the more limited context of regional trade.  . 
Much has been made of the political difficulties facing the Community in responding to the pressures 
from the US and the Cairns Group in agriculture.  But a strong GAIT agreement would be of enormous benefit 
to  the EC's future  commercial agricultural  arrangements. The absence  of such an agreement is  at present 
hampering the further development of trading relationships with other parts of  Europe. This is particularily true 
in the thorny issue of the incorporation of the potential new members, both in EFI'A and Eastern Europe, into 
the Community. 
This leads to the conclusion that a successful outcome to the GATT talks is probably a prerequisite for 
any serious moves towards a true common market in North American agriculture and in Europe.  A  strong 
34 GAIT agreement promising real and sustained agricultural trade liberalization at a multilateral level could also 
be a springboard for further cooperation in policy making at a regional level. 
VITI.  Conclusions 
The examination of the role of agricultural policy in free-trade areas leads to the following conclusions: 
i)  There is a temptation to leave agriculture out of the free-trade rules for an FTA The main problems 
reflect the different support systems and protection levels in the participating countries.  Omitting agriculture 
from the internal free trade arrangement is likely to lead to problems at a later date. 
ii) The problems are caused by both the differences in the level of support and the types of policies used. 
Support levels in principle can be harmonised, but the process will be resisted by domestic interest groups and 
lawmakers. 
iii) In addition, countries will have to rethink policies that remove resources from production and those 
that aim  at market price stability.  These programs will be inherently less effective in a regional free-trade 
environment.  Domestic policy instruments tend to require trade controls to be operative.  An FTA weakens the 
ability of those policies to support farm incomes. 
iv)  Changes in the type of policy used could be the best approach to resolving these problems.  The 
needed changes go in the same direction as those under consideration in the GAIT Round.  The conversion to 
tariffs of non-tariff import barriers; the reduction of export subsidies; the decoupling of domestic programs; and 
the clearer defInition of when sanitary and phytosanitary rules become barriers to trade will all help. 
v)  The implications of FTAs for third countries depend upon the particular countries involved in the 
FTA and their trade balance for various commodities. 
In  genera~ the major commodity conflicts in world trade cannot be solved by free trade agreements on a regional 
basis. 
vi)  Success in the Uruguay Round will make the formation of regional free trade areas much easier. 
Similarly, if such negotiations proceed at a regional level, the agricultural trade relations among blocs may also 
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